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Stabilisation, although clearly defined in 
practitioner handbooks and mission state-
ments, has been vaguely conceptualised and 
weakly theorised by the agencies which prac-
tice it, resulting in missed opportunities and 
unexpected consequences. Despite this, Sta-
bilisation is an overarching concept inform-
ing contemporary intervention and dominat-
ing Northern foreign policy, and continues to 
glean increasing proportions of overseas aid 
budgets (Jackson 2013). 
This paper is prompted by the author’s 
experience as a military analyst, and later 
as a humanitarian, deployed to southern 
Afghanistan. It sets out to make sense of 
conflict, ‘instability’ and Stabilisation praxis 
in the area, asking: ‘how does Stabilisation 
praxis treat peace and conflict in southern 
Afghanistan, to what effect, and why?’ It also 
seeks a deeper understanding of the con-
ceptual foundations and permutations that 
shaped ‘Stabilisation’. Exploring southern 
Afghanistan as a case study, it argues that 
whilst Stabilisation’s conceptual founda-
tions are rooted in the theoretical fields of 
security, development, war and International 
Relations, when it is viewed through the 
lens of peace and conflict there are systemic 
challenges hindering its effectiveness, which 
need to be addressed. Notably, Stabilisa-
tion’s conceptual dependence on the ‘Liberal 
Peace’ is highlighted as one of its root flaws. 
Afghanistan has witnessed an intense, 
multinational Stabilisation effort since inter-
vention in the country in 2001, especially in 
southern Afghanistan: the main epicentre of 
the ‘insurgency’ or ‘civil war’ currently affect-
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This article critically treats stabilisation theory and programming through a perspective of 
peace and conflict, and argues for stabilisation’s reconceptualisation. Through tracking the 
concept’s emergence, it outlines that stabilisation is theoretically rooted in an insecurity-
underdevelopment problematic and relies on the Liberal Peace thesis as a solution. When 
this concept was operationalised in southern Afghanistan, however, it was translated into 
a praxis informed by state-building and counterinsurgency imperatives. This approach ulti-
mately produced confused, sometimes counterproductive, effects: simultaneously engen-
dering a liberal, negative, rented and victor’s peace. The article concludes by arguing that 
stabilisation should be reconceptualised so that it pursues a positive and hybrid peace if 
it is to be a more effective source of guidance for policy and practice. The first step is to 
denaturalise the ‘formal’ state in conflict and fragile environments as being seen as a pana-
cea to all ills of instability.
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ing the country (ANSO 2013: 13, 15). To fur-
ther explore the Stabilisation effort there, 
relevant primary data for this study was col-
lected by the author in August 2012 from 
unstructured interviews conducted with 
fifteen Stabilisation practitioners in the UK 
and Afghanistan, all with recent operational 
experience of Helmand Province, Afghani-
stan. The interviews sought to elicit how 
practitioners understood and expressed what 
they were doing, and why; there is often a dif-
ference between what is outlined or recorded 
‘on paper’ and what the ground reality is, 
and this paper sought to explore the latter. 
Collectively, the research intended to accu-
mulate data on the Stabilisation ‘paradigm’ 
there, intertextually exploring how practi-
tioners themselves problematised instability, 
which then informed why they were doing 
what they were. The subsequent analysis 
discusses the data, identifying the narratives 
and meta-narratives that comprise the Stabi-
lisation paradigm in Helmand, and evaluates 
their efficacy, not in terms of security and 
development, but rather in terms of peace. 
This paper is composed of three parts. 
Firstly, it locates Stabilisation as a concept 
and practice in academic and policy litera-
tures, and argues that it is a resultant epi-
phenomenon of confluent paradigm shifts 
in conflict, security and international devel-
opment; theoretically (and—arguably—erro-
neously) poverty and underdevelopment 
are now mooted as the root causes of inse-
curity. Secondly, it profiles the Stabilisation 
paradigm in southern Afghanistan, not by 
analysing policy documents but rather by 
interviewing practitioners and analysing the 
discourses which shape their understanding 
of what they are doing, and why. The analysis 
suggests that the Stabilisation paradigm is 
dominated by a liberalist meta-narrative that 
fuses state-building with counterinsurgency. 
When viewed through a peace and conflict 
lens, however, this configuration of Stabilisa-
tion engenders a negative, liberal, rented and 
‘victor’s’ peace; therefore, this approach has 
partly been contradictory, counterproductive 
and inconsistent. Resultantly, and thirdly, 
the article advocates for a critical rethink of 
Stabilisation as a concept (which would sub-
sequently alter its operationalisation), away 
from a model that aims to inculcate a nega-
tive, liberal, rented and ‘victor’s’ peace, and 
instead towards a model that realises a posi-
tive and hybrid peace. The article concludes 
by arguing that the first step in this critical 
reconceptualisation is to denaturalise the 
(formal) state from stability analysis and Sta-
bilisation programming. 
The Stabilisation Epiphenomenon
How did Stabilisation conceptually emerge? 
This section describes the coalescence of 
security, conflict and development through 
confluent paradigm shifts, which in turn set 
the preconditions for the advent of Stabili-
sation. It argues that whilst Stabilisation is 
an emergent epiphenomenon of these para-
digm shifts, the fundamental precepts it is 
based upon are unstable. Through analysing 
tensions between interconnected defence, 
development and diplomatic policy practices 
(interlinked through an insecurity-underde-
velopment problematic), it concludes that 
the root cause is the decreasingly-stable 
‘Liberal Peace’ thesis upon which these pol-
icy practices and discourses are essentially 
premised. The section ends asserting that 
Stabilisation has prevailed and proceeded, 
oblivious to its conceptual destabilisation. 
The section begins, however, with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.
After the Cold War, violent conflict, security 
and power were all seemingly reconfigured. 
Whilst the number of interstate wars greatly 
diminished (WB 2012), incidents of intra-
state and transnational conflict appeared 
to rise (Kaldor 2006). These ‘New Wars’ 
later became cyclic patterns of violence. For 
example, 90 per cent of civil wars last dec-
ade occurred in countries that had previously 
experienced a civil war in the preceding three 
decades (WB 2012). Human rights issues 
also became more prominent, and this new 
(rights-based) politico-legal discourse, along 
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with globalised media coverage of human 
suffering and these ‘new’ conflicts—mostly 
genocide, intrastate conflict and violent 
oppression, ushered a paradigm shift from 
‘national security’ towards ‘human security’ 
(Buzan 1997; Booth 2007; Chandler 2011). 
These episodes and undercurrents of human 
suffering were, in turn, attributed to states 
that had ‘failed’ in governing their citizens, or 
were too ‘weak’ to do so (Ghani and Lockhart 
2008). Consequently, states were no longer 
necessarily treated as equals, and so ‘Interna-
tionalism’, the prototypical mechanism for 
conflict management and peace upon which 
the UN Charter was based, seemed increas-
ingly defunct (Chandler 2011), as the inter-
national community became compelled to 
intervene in complex emergencies of other 
sovereign states, particularly in intrastate 
conflicts. The eroding norm of International-
ism was tacitly supplanted by ‘Cosmopolitan 
Interventionism’, in which foreign powers 
might interfere in domestic affairs of other 
countries (without invitation) for the secu-
rity or protection of those citizens (Liden 
et al. 2009). Albeit much later, this thesis is 
perhaps most prominently codified in the 
policy discourse of the ‘Responsibility to Pro-
tect’ (cf. Evans 2008)—formulated after UN 
Secretary-General Annan’s reflection on the 
international community’s failure to inter-
vene in the genocides in Rwanda and, later, 
Srebrenica (2005). 
The growing recognition of intrastate 
conflicts as a new frontier for interven-
tion prompted a rethink of methodology. 
Beforehand, peacekeeping operations sim-
ply entailed inter-positioning militarised 
buffer-zones between belligerents, for exam-
ple in Kashmir, Cyprus and Korea. In intra-
state conflicts, particularly insurgencies, this 
strategy was impractical as wars were often 
fought amongst peoples, and not between 
them (Smith 2005). Peace mechanisms now 
demanded more complex operations. Conse-
quently (but over a decade before ‘Responsi-
bility to Protect’ emerged), in 1992 UN Sec-
retary-General Boutros-Ghali published the 
seminal paper ‘An Agenda for Peace’, which 
outlined an expansive and ambitious project 
for international security: 
‘With the end of the cold war … de-
mands on the United Nations have 
surged. Its security arm, once disabled 
by circumstances it was not created or 
equipped to control, has emerged as a 
central instrument for the prevention 
and resolution of conflicts and for the 
preservation of peace. Our aims must 
be … to address the deepest causes 
of conflict: economic despair, social 
injustice and political oppression’ 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992: paragraph 15).
The paper expanded peace operations 
beyond simple peacekeeping, to include 
both: peace enforcement operations, in 
which security threats were proactively ‘neu-
tralised’; and post-conflict peace-building, 
in which complex, targeted (and intrusive) 
development activities, such as ‘governance 
reforms’ or ‘livelihoods assistance’, were 
applied to consolidate a fledgling peace in 
fragile environments and so to ensure long-
term stability after or during conflict (Liden 
et al. 2009; Pugh et al. 2011). Indeed, post-
conflict peace-building later became the UN’s 
principal peace and security activity after the 
Cold War, with eight major peace-building 
missions between 1989 and 1993 alone: 
Namibia, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, El 
Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia and Rwanda. 
Later, the failure of peace enforcement mis-
sions in Somalia and Bosnia in 1993–94 tem-
porarily stultified peace operations in the 
mid-1990s, although three further opera-
tions commenced between 1995–97: Bosnia, 
Croatia and Guatemala, and a further three 
in 1999: Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Sierra 
Leone. The mandates of the latter three mis-
sions were much more expansive (or ‘intru-
sive’) than their predecessors, focusing less 
on quick intervention and withdrawal, and 
instead upon ‘achieving the conditions for 
basic stability’ (Paris and Sisk 2010), which 
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largely included international development 
programming. At the time such conceits 
were celebrated, but later some criticised the 
now ‘amorphous’ and ‘open-ended’ nature 
of peace operations (witnessed since 1999). 
Hazen called it ‘the seed of its own demise’ 
(2007: 324). 
A parallel theoretical development corre-
sponded with the evolving structure of inter-
national peace operations, which Richmond 
tracks in his ‘genealogy of peace’ (2010). 
According to Richmond, the first generation 
of peace (until the late 1990s) was character-
ised by a body of literature on international 
conflict management through intergovern-
mental institutions and reflected the inter-
national community’s relative inexperience 
in peace operations. Following this, a second 
generation blossomed until the early 2000s. 
Its literature examined the necessity of deal-
ing with human needs by removing direct 
violence, structural violence and injustices 
against individuals (i.e. promulgating ‘human 
security’), and had an expanded academic 
corpus which included: theoretical treat-
ments and cross-case comparisons, political 
economies, critical theories (e.g. neo-Marxist 
approaches, securitisation theory, cosmopol-
itanism, post-structuralism), peace processes 
and spoilers, transitional justice, and gender 
in peace-building (cf. Paris and Sisk 2010). 
Specific prominence, however, was given to 
‘state-building’ in this second generation of 
peace-building literature. Multiple authori-
ties argued that establishing or ‘strengthen-
ing’ governmental institutions was necessary 
for successful war-peace transition (Fukuy-
ama 2004; Chesterman 2004; Fearon and 
Laitin 2004; Krasner 2004; Paris 2004). Rich-
mond’s genealogy goes on to outline third 
and fourth generations of peace, to which we 
will return. For now, this second generation 
requires more careful examination, as it is 
here in which Stabilisation praxis is currently 
conceptually rooted, at least in part.
At the heart of both operational and theo-
retical developments in international peace 
was the convergence, and eventual coales-
cence, of security and development. Two 
major assumptions interconnected inse-
curity and underdevelopment: firstly, that 
fragile states are collocated with territories 
which emanate threats to international secu-
rity; and secondly, that poverty is a driver 
of conflict and radicalisation (cf. Ghani and 
Lockhart 2008). Quantitative evidence sup-
porting this interconnection includes assess-
ments of: a negative correlation between 
GDP per capita and large-scale political con-
flict, as well as high homicide rates; youth 
unemployment being consistently cited in 
perception surveys as a motive for joining 
rebel movements and urban gangs; political 
marginalisation and demographic inequali-
ties being associated with higher risks of civil 
war; and that domestic economic inequali-
ties are attributed to higher risks of violent 
crime (WB 2012). Qualitative assessments 
also allude to this correlation. For instance, 
Peres writes of the Middle East that ‘poverty 
and distress’ propels ‘fanaticism, fundamen-
talism and false messianism’ (1993: 45–6). 
Analysis later went further than mere cor-
relation, describing instead a ‘vicious cycle’ 
that interlinked poverty, desperation and 
violence in war-torn societies (Selby 2011; 
WB 2012). This interplay quickly pervaded 
foreign policies. 
These correlations between peace, devel-
opment and security later galvanized into an 
‘unquestioned orthodoxy’ which conflated 
discourses of security and development (Selby 
2011: 18; Beswick and Jackson 2011; cf. DfID 
2005; Duffield 2001; NORAD 2004; OECD 
2007, 2008; Bensahel et al. 2009; Hensell 
and Gerdes 2012). More recently, the UK Gov-
ernment stated that, ‘[i]n the long term, our 
prosperity and security is intertwined with 
peaceful development and security across 
the globe’ (2011). Moreover, the central mes-
sage of the World Development Report 2011 
is that: ‘strengthening legitimate institutions 
and governance to provide citizen security, 
justice and jobs is crucial to break cycles of 
violence’ (WB 2012: 2). Commenting on this 
phenomenon, but before these policy dis-
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courses were articulated, Duffield explains 
that: ‘the security concerns of metropolitan 
states have merged with the social concerns 
of aid agencies’ (2002: 1067). Indeed, many 
aid agendas focus on those areas of the world 
excluded from globalisation and suffering: 
state collapse, ‘social regression’, the destruc-
tion of social fabric, criminality, violence and 
war (Mosse and Lewis 2005: 9). 
Intertwined with this insecurity-underde-
velopment problematic is another notion: 
states have varying capacities to effectively 
govern their territories and peoples, and that 
‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states reproduce global 
insecurities. Particularly after ‘9/11’, ‘failed’ 
states became one of the key security chal-
lenges and so, again, development was con-
strued as a security solution. Insecurities 
from failed states could be overcome by 
supporting governance reforms and service 
delivery in such states (USAID 2004; DfID 
2009; Darcy and Pavanello 2009; Rotberg 
2006), in order to ultimately enable the 
management of insecurities from intra-state 
conflicts and radical regimes ‘waging proxy 
wars by terrorism’. Such instability, the moral 
logic of the time predicated, must be ame-
liorated lest it be reproduced: containment, 
in the increasingly globalised world, was ‘no 
longer an option’ (Metz and Miller 2005: 42). 
The 2002 US National Security Strategy cor-
roborated this mainstreamed perspective: 
‘America is now threatened less by conquer-
ing states than we are by failing ones’ (DoS 
2002: Section 1). This new understanding of 
security reshaped development. Aid became 
increasingly channelled into enhancing 
states and markets, and a very specific peace-
building template was adopted to address 
new insecurities. This template was formu-
lated through the so-called New York and 
Washington Consensuses, which focused 
on political reconstruction or institution-
alisation (i.e. state-building [Chandler 2011], 
which twins liberalisation and democratisa-
tion of governance systems) and neoliberal 
economic recovery (i.e. capitalist marketisa-
tion [Kahler 2010; Mosse and Lewis 2005: 
4]). This ‘new architecture of aid’ consisted 
of neoliberal policy reforms (geared towards 
poverty reduction and good governance), 
supplanting the conventional investment 
projects of which international development 
programming was previously comprised. 
Duffield narrates a parallel history of devel-
opment aid through a security lens, with aid 
arrangements initially established as part of 
short-term conflict resolution or reconstruc-
tion projects, but later insidiously becoming 
permanent systems of international govern-
ance over ‘zones of insecurity’ (2002: 1062). 
Refuting the rhetoric that emergent forms of 
violent conflict were products of collapsed 
states and international market exclusion, 
Duffield later counter-argued that these 
‘new’ forms of violence are actually resultant 
resistances to the globalising expansion of 
international liberal governance and market 
values (2007). Whilst Duffield was presci-
ent to question the growing nexus between 
security and development, he perhaps over-
stretched his argumentation that ‘new wars’ 
are contra-flows to ‘new’ development, as 
this over-reductionist account perhaps con-
founds violence solely as the result of devel-
opment aid, and obfuscates many other fac-
tors potentially causing violent conflict.
Regardless, security and development 
continue to coalesce, and this has now 
been realised in praxis, as well as policy. For 
instance, there is mounting pressure for 
operations to be blended into ‘interagency’ 
efforts (Metz and Miller 2005: 42), within 
both UN and government departments. 
UN Secretary-General Annan’s report ‘No 
Exit Without Strategy’ (2001) stated that, 
‘the ultimate purpose of a peace operation 
is the achievement of a sustainable peace’. 
This not only conflated peace, security and 
development, but also paved the way for the 
unprecedented totalisation of peace mission 
mandates, that is some operational forces 
became responsible for security, develop-
ment and diplomacy activities and objec-
tives. The UN started to ‘integrate’ different 
‘peace and security’ elements of its program-
Carter: War, Peace and StabilisationArt. 15, page 6 of 20
ming (Shetler-Jones 2008), and governmen-
tal interventions adopted a ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’ in post-war operations, and even. 
However, some argue that this conflation, 
between peacekeepers and peace-builders, 
has gone too far; peacekeepers do not make 
natural peace-builders, and vice versa (e.g. 
Hazen 2007: 334). Nonetheless, at the opera-
tional level, the distinctions between the 
two are increasingly blurred, which has led 
to complications; post-war reconstruction 
essentially and simultaneously comprises a 
‘negative’ task of ending continuing violence 
or preventing relapse into war, and a ‘posi-
tive’ task of constructing a self-sustaining 
peace. These negative and positive tasks are 
mutually interdependent (Ramsbotham et 
al. 2011: 210), but not synonymous.
Whilst the UN faced some criticism over 
the concomitance of its projection of forces 
(defence, development and diplomacy), crit-
ics focused more on other foreign policies 
in which international development pro-
gramming seemed to allow the insertion of 
political, security and economic self-inter-
ests (Liden et al. 2009: 594). This concern 
was exacerbated by recent counterinsur-
gency campaigns. Aid was soon considered 
key to winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
populations and overcoming local resist-
ances (Gordon et al. 2010; Kilcullen 2009; 
Kevlihan 2012). Civil-military cooperation 
was promoted, partly seeking to employ 
development activities to achieve political 
and military objectives in military ‘area of 
operations’. The UK Post Conflict Recon-
struction Unit (PCRU) was established in 
2004, in order to facilitate interdepartmen-
tal coordination between political, security 
and development departments (FCO, MoD, 
DfID) in the post-war physical reconstruc-
tion process. The establishment of Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in contempo-
rary counterinsurgency campaigns were the 
operationalised elements of such interde-
partmental coordination. In both develop-
ments, there was a sense of growing unease 
with the ‘securitisation’ of development aid 
through what seemed to be a military appro-
priation of Stabilisation activities (Muggah 
2009). This interdepartmental coordination 
was further complicated. The stalled pro-
gress of reconstruction in Afghanistan led 
the PCRU to understand that an infrastruc-
ture-focused approach was insufficient, and 
so its discourse ‘borrowed increasingly from 
developments in the fragile state literature 
in order to address the issues both of poor 
governance and the lack of social capital 
that characterised the Afghan environment’ 
(Gordon et al. 2010: 33–34). Similar develop-
ments were witnessed in US apparatus (e.g. 
Bensahel et al. 2009). 
‘Stabilisation’ emerged as a powerful pol-
icy discourse only months after the estab-
lishment of the PCRU (Gordon et al. 2010), 
although its definition still seemed ‘loose’. 
The RAND Corporation, a US think tank 
first formed to provide research and analy-
sis to the US armed forces following World 
War II, defines Stabilisation as ‘the efforts to 
end social, economic and political upheaval, 
and reconstruction, which includes efforts 
to develop or redevelop institutions that 
foster self-governance, social and economic 
development, and security, are critical to 
securing political objectives before, dur-
ing, or after conflict’ (Bensahel et al. 2009: 
ix). In 2011, the UK government issued their 
‘Building Stability Overseas Strategy,’ signed 
by all three foreign policy departments. The 
paper signalled a new direction in UK poli-
cies designed to stabilise foreign countries, 
and described ‘stability’ in terms of: 
‘…political systems which are repre-
sentative and legitimate, capable of 
managing conflict and change peace-
fully, and societies in which human 
rights and rule of law are respected, 
basic needs are met, security estab-
lished and opportunities for social 
and economic development are open 
to all. This type of “structural stability”, 
which is built on the consent of the 
population, is resilient and flexible 
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in the face of shocks, and can evolve 
over time as the context changes’ (UK 
Government 2011: 5).
In both UK and US definitions of Stabilisa-
tion, instability is problematised through 
both fragile states and poverty—a problem 
which ‘Stabilisation’ activities solve through 
work on security, governance, infrastruc-
ture and livelihoods (UK Government 2008, 
2011; Bensahel et al. 2009). Clearly, both 
definitions outlined above were formed by 
groups who viewed instability as a problem 
foreign policy might solve. This conceptu-
alisation has shaped contemporary Stabilisa-
tion praxis. More importantly, in such papers 
there is a notable lack of engagement with 
any relevant academic literature beyond 
World Bank reports (e.g. WB 2012, which cites 
poverty as a driver of conflict and insecurity) 
or source texts which problematise insecu-
rity through a lens of state failure: ‘Stabiliza-
tion and reconstruction operations occur in 
places where host governments are weak or 
have lost the capacity to govern effectively’ 
(Bensahel et al. 2009: ix). From evaluating 
these key policy documents on Stabilisation, 
and tracking its conceptual origins, it is plain 
that Stabilisation theory is entwined with, 
and informed by, the insecurity-underdevel-
opment problematic and the ‘failed states’ 
thesis. That is to say, ‘Stabilisation’ problema-
tises instability in terms of weak governance 
and poverty, and therefore responds to insta-
bility accordingly. This configuration of Sta-
bilisation corresponds with Richmond’s third 
generation of peace (2010), which is attrib-
uted to the ‘Liberal Peace’ thesis—a concept 
succinctly summarised by Paris: 
‘The central tenet of this paradigm is 
the assumption that the surest foun-
dation for peace … is market democ-
racy, that is, a liberal domestic pol-
ity and a market-oriented economy 
… Peace-building is in effect an enor-
mous experiment that involves trans-
planting western models of social, 
political, and economic organization 
into war-shattered states in order to 
control civil conflict: in other words, 
pacification through political and 
economic liberalization’ (1997: 56).
Importantly, this is not the only method in 
which instability can be problematised, and 
this is not the only way to conceptualise and 
define stability. Primarily, Stabilisation is not 
a new term. It previously pertained to macro-
economic theory, but was conceptually and 
functionally very different to its manifesta-
tion today. Regardless, such reflections on 
the nature of stability from economic prem-
ises are enlightening, and contrast against 
the contemporary conceptualisation of 
Stabilisation in terms of international secu-
rity. Maier, a historian of political economy, 
describes that:
‘”[S]tability” tended to supplant “or-
der” in postwar social science termi-
nology … Stability can accommodate 
a more dynamic state than order: a 
balance of countervailing social and 
political movements rather than 
mere quiescence … Stability implies a 
cybernetic capacity for self-correction, 
a homeostatic tendency to return to 
equilibrium‘ (1987: 262). 
Although speaking of economic stabilisation 
from the 1980s, in the twilight of the Cold 
War and before the proliferation of so-called 
‘New Wars’ Maier’s questioning of Stabilisa-
tion (1987: 272–73) is prescient and central 
to this discussion. Maier’s notion of Stabili-
sation contrasts with current policy formu-
lations. It is less prescriptive—operationally 
and normatively, and simply conceptualises 
it as an equitable societal resilience which 
can be equilibrated; quite different to cur-
rent methods of simply imposing the blue-
prints of a market democracy onto foreign 
sovereignties. Maier’s conceptualisation of 
stability, however, is not the one currently 
operationalised, and it therefore behoves us 
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to challenge the assumptions undergirding 
our current format of Stabilisation. 
Notably, assumptions similar to those 
undergirding (current) Stabilisation also 
shaped Terrorism Studies, prior to its recent 
‘critical’ turn. In Terrorism Studies many dom-
inant myths were assumed without corrobo-
rating empirical evidence for a long period of 
time (Reid 1993). Such myths included: ter-
rorism aims primarily to cause destruction 
and chaos; the roots of terrorism lie in pov-
erty, religious extremism and individual psy-
chology, and not necessarily in state policies, 
occupation or legitimate grievances; individ-
uals become involved in terrorism through 
personality defects, deviance, criminal ten-
dencies, religious radicalisation or psycho-
logical abnormalities; democratic states are 
more vulnerable to terrorism because of the 
inherent rights and freedoms they provide; 
the media often aids terrorism by providing 
it with oxygen for publicity etc. (cf. Jackson 
et al. 2011: 23). Particularly relevant to the 
insecurity-underdevelopment problematic, 
however, is Gunning’s study (2007) of the 
socio-political movement Hamas, which 
revealed that terrorist tactics were more 
readily adopted by the better educated and 
‘better off’, thus discrediting the myth con-
necting poverty and terrorism. Similar criti-
cal works have yet to (dis)prove the insecu-
rity-underdevelopment hypothesis, although 
recent works go as far as arguing that liberal-
ist assumptions are erroneously essentialist, 
that poverty is not a ‘trans-historical cause of 
violence’ and that middle classes and busi-
ness communities are not inherently paci-
fist—middle classes typically provide leader-
ships for revolutionary mobilisations (Selby 
2011: 26). Nonetheless, such works have yet 
to percolate into policy discourse and praxis; 
contemporary discourses continue to con-
found the insecurity-underdevelopment cor-
relation with causation (e.g. WB 2012). 
Recent publications, however, have started 
to critique the assumptions of the Liberal 
Peace, upon which Stabilisation is ultimately 
premised, as does this article. Selby argues 
that the liberalist rationale linking poverty 
(and hence ‘development’) with violence is 
fallacious because it is over-reductionist, 
citing political economy studies of conflict 
which revealed that ‘shadow’ and criminal-
ised economies simultaneously reduced 
poverty but also intensified violence (e.g. 
in Afghanistan, Colombia and Liberia), thus 
discrediting the general expectation that 
less poverty leads to less violence (2011). 
Moreover, the positive correlation between 
freedom for capital (in marketised econo-
mies) and freedom for the poor has also 
been questioned; free trade appears more 
closely related to growing socio-economic 
inequalities than related to income gains or 
welfare for the poor (Storm and Rao 2004: 
571). Cramer (2010) challenges analysts 
to move beyond the simplistic notion that 
war is ‘development in reverse’ (cf. Collier 
2007: 27), and identify how war economies 
can be transformed into peace economies. 
Roberts’ analysis of Cambodia reveals a 
‘deep persistence’ in patterns of patronage 
before, during and after the country hosted 
a major peace operation in the 1990s, and 
he concludes that after nearly two decades of 
state-building, socio-political change in both 
the metropolitan elites and rural masses of 
Cambodia is superficial, and dominated by 
informal patronage systems and clientelism, 
as opposed to the ‘impartial, independent 
and impersonal institutions associated with 
the democratic prerogative explicit in state-
building and democratization’ (2009: 149). 
A similar analysis outlining the resilience of 
traditional patronage networks and politics 
in Helmand Province, Afghanistan is advo-
cated by Martin (2011). 
Other concerns with the Liberal Peace ape 
the ‘critical turn’ in Security Studies, which 
asks ‘whose security’ is being afforded and 
at what (and whose) cost? Similar questions 
have been asked of peace (‘for whom? And 
at what cost?’), as some ‘beneficiaries’ may 
hold views antithetical to the notions of the 
Liberal Peace, such as seen in Mac Ginty’s 
study of Lebanon (2007). The limitations 
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and biases of the Liberal Peace are increas-
ingly coming to the fore, and already a small 
literature on ‘Post-Liberal Peace and Govern-
ance’ is crystallising (e.g. Chandler 2010). Sta-
bilisation policy practices however have yet 
to catch up and engage with the academic 
debate encapsulating peace and conflict 
theory, and this schism has obvious ramifica-
tions. Perhaps most importantly, it suggests 
that without critical reflection and appropri-
ate structural redress, any developments in 
Stabilisation will simply make an ineffective 
process more efficient, and not more effec-
tive. To sum, this section has argued that Sta-
bilisation’s precepts are conceptually unsta-
ble—nucleating around a core of the Liberal 
Peace which, itself, is imploding. The next 
section examines how this flawed concep-
tualisation has affected the operationalisa-
tion of Stabilisation; arguably if Stabilisation 
had been better conceptualised, it would be 
more effective at equitably pacifying conflict 
and fragile environments.
The Stabilisation Paradigm in 
Helmand, Afghanistan
The first section asked: how did Stabilisation 
emerge conceptually? This section follows 
on from this exploration examining: how is 
Stabilisation currently practised, and to what 
effect? Profiling a case study of Helmand 
Province, Afghanistan, it discusses the Stabi-
lisation ‘paradigm’ in operation there. It does 
so through analysing practitioner discourses 
from primary data collected in unstructured 
interviews, which enabled them to express–
in their own terms–what they are or were 
trying to achieve, and why (the method and 
rationale for the study is outlined in the arti-
cle’s opening paragraphs). Analysis of the 
primary research revealed five main narra-
tives that shaped the Stabilisation paradigm, 
but that there was a dominant meta-narra-
tive (interlaced between four of the five nar-
ratives) which conceptualised Stabilisation 
as a liberal fusion of counterinsurgency and 
state-building. The section assesses that prac-
titioners’ views ultimately conformed to the 
same conceptualisation of Stabilisation in 
terms of security and development. However, 
it concludes that, when viewed through the 
lens of peace and conflict and in the harsh 
light of southern Afghanistan, this form of 
Stabilisation might create inconsistent—if 
not counterproductive—effects on peace and 
stability, and might not overcome the roots 
of violent conflict.
Southern Afghanistan has an unenviable 
history of violent conflict. Notwithstanding 
imperial wars from antiquity through to the 
‘Great Game’ between Britain and Russia, the 
area has suffered more than three consecu-
tive decades of internecine violence to date. 
In 1978 Afghanistan was taken by Commu-
nist coup and, later, southern Afghanistan 
became the site of another proxy battle—the 
Cold War, where Soviet forces fought US, 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan-funded resistance 
groups (often co-belligerents with locally-
based militias). Soviet forces withdrew in 1989 
following campaign failure, and later the 
communist-backed government imploded in 
1992 after Soviet funding ceased. State col-
lapse created a power vacuum and the sub-
sequent chaos left much infighting between 
local powerbrokers. It was during this chaos 
that the Taliban formed: a Kandahar-based, 
armed, social movement, recruited from 
across Mujahideen and tribal groupings. It 
eventually seized power in 1996 and contin-
ued waging (civil) war against the Northern 
Alliance. After the destruction of the World 
Trade Centre in 2001 by the Afghanistan-
based Al-Qaeda movement, a US-led military 
response dislodged the Taliban government. 
Following international intervention in 
Helmand Province, many non-Helmandi 
Taliban members fled. US Special Forces 
attempted to co-opt local militias to hunt 
Al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants, although 
a trend of incidents involved co-opted mili-
tias identifying those they had local vendet-
tas or grievances with as Taliban, summon-
ing Western military power to wreak wrath 
upon their enemies, and thus frustrating 
the campaign (Martin 2011). After the ini-
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tial military campaign routed ‘the Taliban’, 
the international community agreed a five-
year strategy on Afghanistan in 2001, which 
launched the reconstruction process and 
aimed for political elections by 2005. The 
Bonn Agreement, in part, defined the Stabi-
lisation mission in Afghanistan as assisting 
the Afghan government in ‘providing’ secu-
rity until they were able to do so themselves 
(Rubin and Hamidzada 2011). Many Hel-
mandi commanders, pre-Taliban powerbro-
kers, eschewed their Taliban affiliations and 
assumed positions in the state or security 
architecture, often retaining similar patron-
age networks (Martin 2011). Five years hence, 
the Afghanistan Compact signed in London 
in 2006 outlined international political com-
mitments for peace and stability in Afghani-
stan, to ‘overcome a legacy of conflict’. 
Security Sector Reform (SSR), considered its 
most pressing demand, was subsequently 
divided thematically between major coali-
tion partners: Police Reform (Germany), Judi-
ciary (Italy), Counter-Narcotics (UK), Defence 
Reform (US), and Disarmament, Demobili-
zation and Reintegration (Japan) (Cowper-
Coles 2011). Geographically however, Afghan 
provinces were distributed between partici-
pant military forces to ‘provide security’. The 
UK found its place in Helmand Province, the 
heart of the Afghan opium industry, and 
British forces have remained there since with 
units ‘cycled’ approximately every six months 
as part of Operation HERRICK. At the time 
of writing it is in its eighteenth operational 
deployment cycle. 
The military in Afghanistan is waging a 
counterinsurgency campaign against ‘pock-
ets of resistance’ and transitory insurgent 
and terrorist networks (Jones 2008). The 
current military operation is concomitant 
with the international Stabilisation effort, 
which operates through a parallel system 
to (formal) Afghan governance structures. 
At a provincial level, the Stabilisation effort 
has Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), 
which include units directly supporting 
Afghan line ministries in the province, as 
well as interfacing with international mili-
tary apparatus. In Lashkar Gah, the provin-
cial capital of Helmand, 200 PRT staff (60% 
civilian, 20% military, 20% Afghan) purport-
edly ‘coordinate international stabilisation 
and development work across Helmand’ 
(Helmand PRT 2012). PRTs are mandated to 
‘assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
extend its authority, to facilitate the develop-
ment of a stable and secure environment in 
the identified area of operations, and enable 
SSR and reconstruction efforts’ (Rubin and 
Hamidzada 2011: 14). The PRT in Lashkar 
Gah explicitly states that:
‘We are working to deliver a single 
Helmand Plan that has been agreed 
between the Government of Afghani-
stan and its international partners. 
The plan is structured around seven 
themes: Politics and Reconciliation; 
Governance; Rule of Law (Justice, Po-
lice and Prisons); Security; Economic 
and Social Development; Counter 
Narcotics; and Strategic Communica-
tions’ (Helmand PRT 2012).
Ostensibly then, the Liberal Peace thesis 
is made manifest through Helmand PRT 
and its Stabilisation mission—but, from the 
perspective of peace and conflict, just how 
stabilising is the Stabilisation programme? 
To ascertain this, it is necessary to exam-
ine the conflict structurally, and consider 
what contribution Stabilisation has made to 
peace. The ‘drivers’ of conflict in Helmand 
are described as a ‘poisonous admixture of 
long-running tribal vendettas, competition 
between narco-mafias or criminal groups, 
and violent dissatisfaction with a notoriously 
predatory local administration and police 
service’ (Gordon 2011: 3). Although the same 
author later qualifies that: ‘[t]he proximate 
roots of Helmand’s conflict lie in how the 
post-Taliban carve-up of institutions, power, 
and resources favoured certain tribal groups 
at the expense of others … Losers in the 
carve-up lost resources while accumulating 
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grievances, and therefore were made vulner-
able to Taliban infiltration and offers of pro-
tection’ (Gordon 2011: 4). Foreign presence 
is also often cited as part of the problem: 
‘civilian casualties, night raids, population 
displacement, and destruction of productive 
infrastructure through NATO air attacks were 
additional drivers of conflict’ (Gordon 2011: 
4). However, as this paper outlines, these 
drivers of conflict appear in some respects to 
have been more deeply entrenched by Sta-
bilisation practices, rather than alleviated or 
ameliorated by them.
Moreover, upon historical reflection, Gor-
don’s analysis of Helmand-based conflict 
applies not only contemporaneously—it 
could be applied to any previous era of vio-
lence in Afghanistan: Cold-War, Soviet inva-
sion, state-formation, colonial expansion, 
and antiquity. However, this is not to posit 
some neo-orientalist cultural essentialism, 
but rather to demonstrate that the structural 
drivers of conflict in Helmand have never 
been fully addressed by past conflicts and 
governance developments, and that—his-
torically and topically—these contextualised, 
structural issues have been poorly under-
stood. This mismatch between conflict and 
counteraction is the central and motivating 
problem behind this study, and it is hoped 
that a revitalised research agenda will better 
sensitise Stabilisation praxis.
If not redressing the structural drivers of 
conflict, then what is Stabilisation doing in 
Helmand? Whilst informed by literature, 
document analysis and participant observa-
tion (this author was previously a military 
analyst with the British Army in Helmand, 
and later a humanitarian in Kandahar), this 
study included primary research of inter-
views collected during August 2012 from a 
sample of fifteen Stabilisation practitioners 
based in Afghanistan, the UK and US, of vary-
ing role and position. Discourse analysis of 
the unstructured interviews with practition-
ers on Stabilisation, which analysed intertex-
tuality between revealed five main narratives 
that collectively construct the Stabilisation 
paradigm in Helmand, conceptualising it as: 
1. Reconstruction (material and politi-
cal) and temporary service provision 
(Interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14)
2. Reduction or cessation of armed vio-
lence (Interviews 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 
13, 15)
3. ‘Consent-winning’ (Interviews 3, 4, 5, 
9, 11, 14)
4. Repairing the war-torn fabric of soci-
ety (Interviews 6, 10, 13, 14, 15) 
5. Enhancement of the citizen-state 
‘social contract’ (Interview 13, 15)
The main narrative (1) centred on Stabilisa-
tion as political and material reconstruction 
and the temporary provision of government 
or basic services (e.g. UK Government 2010 
on ‘Stabilisation infrastructure’), although 
some affirmed that there was more to Sta-
bilisation (interviews 8 and14). For example, 
reconstruction and restoration of service 
delivery is also seen as a method to gener-
ate or consolidate trust in the formal politi-
cal processes and facilitating longer-term 
development assistance (Jarvenpaa 2008; 
also, interview 14). It is apparent that there is 
a direct relationship between State-building 
and Stabilisation through this dominant dis-
course, nuanced slightly in that Stabilisation 
not only entails State-building, but tempo-
rary ‘state-substitution’ until the state-under-
construction is robust enough to govern 
itself autonomously. Moreover, whilst this 
main discourse perhaps addressed the poor 
governance and poverty/development issues 
(discussed in the preceding section), the 
other major narrative (2) pertained to over-
coming physical insecurity (in this case, insur-
gency and crime). This was seen as a counter-
insurgency strand of Stabilisation (interviews 
3 and 8), albeit an incidental one (interview 
15), in which security threats to stability were 
‘neutralised’ (cf. Kilcullen 2009; also, inter-
view 4). Another narrative (3), interlaced ele-
ments from these two dominant narratives, 
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suggesting that Stabilisation projects were, 
in part, designed to ‘win’ the support of ‘the 
population’ away from ‘the insurgency’ and 
towards ‘the official Afghan state’: Stabilisa-
tion is concomitant with the (in)famous (if 
not outdated) ‘battle for hearts and minds’ 
(cf. Mackay and Tatham 2011; also, interview 
4). Another narrative (5) nuanced the ‘con-
sent winning’ discourse, construing it not in 
terms of counter-insurgency, but as a proto-
political mechanism that enhanced the 
‘social contract’ between citizen and state. 
That is, it was not intended to directly win 
support of ‘the population’ towards a govern-
ment, but rather to lay the groundwork for 
state-formation, otherwise state-building in 
Afghanistan would simply be a government 
‘without a state’ (interview 15).
These four narratives (1, 2, 3 and 5 above) 
nonetheless appear robustly interconnected, 
and suggest that the dominant meta-nar-
rative of the Stabilisation paradigm in Hel-
mand is a fusion of state-building and coun-
terinsurgency; this meta-narrative appears 
firmly rooted in the ideas encapsulated in 
Richmond’s second and third generations 
of peace theory (2010). However, there 
appeared to be another meta-narrative, 
suppressed and subordinated by this first 
meta-narrative. It primarily stood behind 
the remaining narrative (4), ‘Stabilisation as 
reparation of war-torn social fabric’, and was 
often articulated in terms of, ‘when local peo-
ple could return to going about their daily 
business unhindered by threats of violence’ 
(interviews 7 and 10). When this narrative 
(4) was further probed, it became apparent 
that participants had idealised effective ‘rule 
of law’ as a key aspect of Stability, that is, a 
localised capacity to self-manage violence 
and conflict. Moreover, as research partici-
pants espousing the second narrative (i.e. 
Stabilisation as reducing/ceasing armed 
violence) were pressed to explain it, they 
also arrived at similar conclusions as those 
whom advocated the fourth narrative, for 
two reasons. Firstly, the presence of security 
actors inherently engenders resistance, as 
they ‘contest’ previously uncontested areas. 
The absence of security actors might also 
correlate with a decrease of armed violence 
(as there would simply be no-one to combat), 
although this is not synonymous with stabil-
ity (interview 11). Secondly, the assumption 
that a stable environment is one free from 
conflict is fallacious (Beswick and Jackson 
2011: 145). Therefore, there are actually two 
meta-narratives at interplay: one dominant 
meta-narrative—Stabilisation as a liberalist 
fusion of state-building and counterinsur-
gency, and an inferior or suppressed meta-
narrative—Stabilisation as localised conflict 
management (similar, in many respects, to 
Maier’s [1987] definition). But what do either 
of these meta-narratives mean in terms of 
peace? For the dominant meta-narrative, let 
us consider its constituent concepts in turn: 
state-building, then counterinsurgency. 
State-building is a particular approach to 
peace-building, premised on the notion that 
security and development in post-conflict 
societies largely depends on the existence 
of capable, autonomous and legitimate 
governmental institutions (Paris and Sisk 
2010: 1–2). Peace-building is generally char-
acterized as the broad project of overcom-
ing structural and cultural violence (con-
flict transformation), in conjunction with 
peace-making between belligerents (conflict 
resolution) and peacekeeping (conflict con-
tainment) (Ramsbotham et al. 2011). Follow-
ing this, state-building is described as, ‘the 
development of international regulatory 
mechanisms aimed at addressing cases of 
intra-state conflict and state ‘collapse’ (i.e. at 
shoring up ‘failing states’), which are consid-
ered most pressing problems for global secu-
rity, on ethical, humanitarian and … realist 
grounds’ (Chandler 2011: 339). But it is also 
described as a duplicitous practice—on one 
hand, ensuring that foreign, underdeveloped 
states can autonomously govern themselves, 
but on the other hand intrusively ensuring 
that these underdeveloped states govern 
themselves in a way befitting our expecta-
tions of them, as they may ‘lack an adequate 
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understanding to cope with freedom with-
out this leading to conflict or oppression’ 
(Chandler 2010: 4). This dynamic was later 
dubbed ‘post-liberal governance’. It could be 
construed that Stabilisation in Helmand is a 
duplicitous form of post-liberal governance; 
observers, for instance, are concerned of par-
allel forms of governance the Stabilisation 
effort affords the Afghan people, i.e. PRTs 
vs. Afghan governance (BBC 2011). Further, 
occasionally international and Afghan con-
ceptions of state-building diverge (Nixon and 
Ponzio 2011: 36).
Stabilisation might also be seen as coun-
terproductive or counterintuitive in terms 
of peace and stability. In Afghanistan, state-
building essentially entails centralising 
power away from its current de facto and 
fragmented distribution across regional 
and local powerbrokers to a ‘formal’ state 
governance system: an activity which seems 
intensely destabilising, as many powerbro-
kers may simply resist the appropriation of 
their power and resources. Therefore, state-
building is no cure to instability, or at least 
an oversimplified post-war peace-building 
method. Post-conflict environments are 
socially complex (i.e. uneasily broken down 
into constituent parts), and such ‘social engi-
neering’ such as state-building, ‘in the after-
math of civil wars is much more difficult 
than many external state-builders originally 
expected’ (Reisinger 2009: 495). Indeed, the 
history of success of peace-building through 
state-building is questionable. Most coun-
tries which hosted peace-building missions 
have not reverted to full war, but the dura-
bility of peace even in the most ‘successful’ 
cases is less clear. Paris and Sisk question the 
success of peace-building where missions: 
‘…did little to address deep socio-eco-
nomic inequalities, which have argu-
ably been among the root causes of 
the region’s violent past? What about 
the utter failure of peace-building in 
Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide, 
or the on-again, off-again progress 
in Angola or Sierra Leone? And what 
should we make of the burst of re-
newed fighting in Timor-Leste in 
2006, in a country that was widely 
touted as one of the most notable 
peace-building successes? Such out-
comes have raised doubts about pros-
pects for peace-building and state-
building even in relatively favourable 
settings’ (2010: 11).
Similar fears exist for state-building in 
Afghanistan. One of the key contentions, 
generally, is that the ‘liberal’ characteris-
tics of international state-building may not 
transpose to local values and political struc-
tures. A deeper question to probe is: ‘is lib-
eral peace-building compatible with cultural 
and political pluralism? Does it depend on 
global and regional hegemonies of power?’ 
(Liden et al. 2009: 588). Whilst this question 
is too broad for the constraints of this study, 
understanding the compatibility of the Lib-
eral Peace with local cultures and politics is, 
in itself, a research gap Stabilisation practi-
tioners require further guidance on. Moreo-
ver, there is concern that Stabilisation is too 
state-centric in its approach; if state-building 
is inherently destabilising, duplicitous, and 
questionably compatible with communities 
of non-liberal values and structures, is too 
much emphasis placed on the state, or state-
building, as panacea for the ills of instability 
and insecurity? 
Asides from state-building, the other 
strand of the dominant meta-narrative 
shaping Stabilisation is counterinsurgency, 
and we should question its precise effect in 
terms of peace. Firstly, however, it should be 
considered that there is a lack of consensus 
amongst practitioners on the precise rela-
tionship between counterinsurgency and 
Stabilisation; some argue that the two have 
complementary objectives and so should col-
laborate, whilst others emphasise the need 
for distinct separation between the two. The 
RAND Institute advocates a pro-complemen-
tarity stance: 
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‘Military doctrine also emphasises the 
complementarity of stability opera-
tions and counterinsurgency and re-
lated missions. Indeed, counterinsur-
gency is defined as requiring offensive 
operations, defensive operations and 
stability operations. As noted, both 
stabilization and reconstruction can 
support counterinsurgency, and ef-
fective counterinsurgency operations 
make stabilization and reconstruction 
possible’ (Bensahel et al. 2009: 6).
Similar positions are advocated within 
recent counterinsurgency texts (e.g. Kilcul-
len 2009). Yet, tensions between the short-
term imperatives of counterinsurgency (e.g. 
winning the consent of local communities 
as a security strategy) and the longer-term, 
deeper objectives of Stabilisation or state-
building (cf. Jackson and Gordon 2007) 
raise concerns that counter-insurgency 
securitises Stabilisation. Friesendorf (2011: 
91), for instance, urges donors’ restraint 
against paramilitarising Afghan police units 
for counterinsurgency purposes. Whilst 
paramilitary functions of local police units 
fill security gaps in the short term, it pre-
cludes them from actualising their (rule of) 
law enforcement role. Another contention 
is the apparent securitisation of Stabilisa-
tion resources, earmarked for development 
or reconstruction purposes; the military’s 
use of ‘cash as a weapon system’ (interview 
15), referring to its ability to achieve mili-
tary objectives with selective disbursement 
of development aid, is entwined with this 
meta-narrative of Stabilisation; however, this 
subordination of development objectives 
to military ones would be dimly viewed by 
humanitarians (Shetler-Jones 2008; Drolet 
2006; also, Gentile 2009). This emphasis on 
paramilitarisation and securitisation dem-
onstrates that current Stabilisation efforts 
focus largely towards ‘a negative peace’, i.e. 
the absence, or the coercive, monopolising 
prevention, of violence—not the structural 
changes addressing causes of conflict, as in 
‘positive peace’ (cf. Galtung 1969). To further 
nuance this, the use of development aid to 
‘buy’ local acquiescence and security might 
be described as a ‘rented peace’.
Counter-insurgency also faces its own prob-
lem. The International Security Assistance 
Force’s (ISAF) senior intelligence official pub-
lished a hard-hitting report on the counter-
insurgency strategy’s shortcomings, notably 
its misallocation of intelligence resources. 
He lambasted the counterinsurgency effort 
to actually only be an ‘anti-insurgency’ effort, 
treating only the symptoms—not addressing 
the causes—of the insurgency, by focusing 
resources on neutralising insurgent net-
works instead of the underlying drivers of 
conflict (Flynn et al. 2010). However, Flynn’s 
report, perhaps, was not radical enough. As 
counterinsurgency studies have proceeded 
on the basis that the status quo needs pro-
tection from the ‘problems’ of socio-political 
change, armed conflict and ‘terrorism’ (cf. 
Jackson et al. 2011: 20–21), the formal state 
(both government and security wings) might 
be overlooked as contributing to instability. 
The onus therefore is to denaturalise the 
status quo, in order to critically evaluate the 
environment. If the Stabilisation paradigm 
is partly constituted by counterinsurgency, 
then it is biased towards preserving the sta-
tus quo—a ‘victor’s peace’—not an equitable 
or sustainable peace, and biased towards 
national—and not human—security.
Re-Problematising Instability,  
Re-Operationalising Stabilisation
This article has argued that the Stabilisa-
tion paradigm in Helmand appears to com-
prise state-building and counterinsurgency, 
effectively entailing that Stabilisation praxis 
builds (somewhat contradictorily) a liberal, 
negative, ‘rented’ and victor’s peace. Perhaps, 
upon this reflection, it is necessary to criti-
cally rethink the Stabilisation paradigm? A 
critical turn in Stabilisation would denude 
the field of unfounded assumptions. Critical-
ity, in Stabilisation, entails that analysts no 
longer treat conflict, instability and insur-
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gency as an unproblematic and exception-
alised form of political violence that can be 
objectively defined, categorised, explained 
and solved (cf. Gunning 2007). Employing a 
social constructivist stance towards conflict 
and ‘stability’ means that widely-accepted 
knowledge about the phenomena should 
be approached with caution, questioned. 
Accordingly, this study has interrogated, 
questioned and destabilised dominant 
understandings and approaches to Stabili-
sation, from a fresh perspective: peace and 
conflict theory, to understand issues that 
were otherwise inveigled by interpreting 
stability solely through Security and Devel-
opment, and to a lesser extent War (particu-
larly: counterinsurgency) and International 
Relations (particularly: state-building). The 
key issue in this article is: what kind of peace 
and stability is Stabilisation in Helmand 
realising? Pertinently, Goodhand asks when 
reflecting on Afghanistan if, ‘peace-building 
is concerned exclusively with constructing 
political order in the absence of violence 
rather than adhering to a higher standard of 
… peace?’ (2008: 419).
The opening section of this study located 
Stabilisation as rooted within the second and 
third generations of peace theory (particu-
larly: Liberal Peace), later arguing that the 
model was conceptually flawed as the Lib-
eral Peace counterproductively engaged with 
the root causes of conflict and instability 
in southern Afghanistan. Later generations 
of peace literature, with which policy dis-
courses have yet to properly engage, examine 
hybrid political orders: realist arrangements 
of state and non-state centres of political 
power (Richmond 2010). For instance, Reis-
inger (2009), using comparative studies of 
Liberia and Mozambique, argues that view-
ing post-conflict transition only in terms of a 
linear trajectory towards ‘consolidated state-
hood’ was unsatisfactory, and instead ana-
lysts should examine the diverse interactions 
of: formal government, external actors, and 
informal powers, because state-centric expla-
nations are erroneously over-reductionist. 
Beswick and Jackson note that there is a ten-
dency for planners, policymakers and even 
researchers, ‘to address all conflict issues at 
the level of the nation-state’, but that this 
fails to address a systemic assumption that 
all conflicts are fundamentally similar and 
might be reduced to a single set of explana-
tory variables, i.e. the similarity hypothesis 
(2011: 135–6). Gunning (2007) recommends 
that analysis identifies, and interconnects, 
macro-, meso- and micro-levels of political 
violence. In terms of Stabilisation, macro-
level drivers of conflict (i.e. at the state and 
international levels) are not necessarily the 
same at the meso-level or micro-level driv-
ers of conflict (i.e. at the provincial, district 
and village levels). Indeed, the presence of 
‘the state’ is largely absent at the micro-level, 
which highlights the mismatch between a 
Stabilisation strategy focusing on formal gov-
ernance reforms (i.e. state-building) and the 
diffuse violent conflict of an insurgency it is 
attempting to redress. Perhaps Stabilisation 
should neglect state-building entirely?
A non-state-centric perspective produces 
different assessments of the environment. 
For example, a state-centric perspective of 
Mozambique masked the country’s poverty 
and limited human development despite 
liberal governance reforms. Similarly, in Libe-
ria such a perspective did not account for 
future violent tensions in spite of democratic 
change. Through reconceptualising fragile 
states as hybrid political orders, new options 
for addressing instability can be envisaged 
(Boege et al. 2009: 611). Similar to Roberts’ 
analysis of resilient patronage patterns in 
Cambodia despite decades of state-building, 
Boege et al., through an anthropological 
cross-comparison of East Timor, Somaliland 
and Bougainville, argue that peace-building 
must drastically expand beyond the narrow 
vision of a Western-style, liberal democratic 
state. Eriksen’s analysis of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (2009) goes as far to 
argue that the strategy of ‘strengthening’ this 
rigid model of the state ultimately contrib-
uted to state weakness, and raises a funda-
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mental question over the universality of the 
liberal peace. State-building, Anne Brown et 
al. (2010) argue, is fully challenged in light 
of ‘hybrid political orders’ which provide 
realist analysis of the interplay of state and 
non-state political powerbrokers. In terms 
of Afghanistan, Giustozzi’s analysis of the 
economic interests of powerbrokers reveals 
the dilemma of whether to ostracize or 
(politically) include warlords with politico-
economic interests in illicit industries or 
powerbrokers with histories of rights viola-
tions, and he argues that through a politico-
economic lens the ‘conflict’ is not between 
some abstract ‘state’ and informal power 
bases (e.g. warlords), but ‘between different 
social forces that are competing for social 
control’ (2011: 85, citing Raeymakers 2005). 
The answer, therefore, is not to dismiss the 
state, but rather to denaturalise the state as an 
accepted monopoly of power; analysts would 
have to understand the hybridised nature of 
politics, between formal and informal struc-
tures. In doing so, opportunities arise for Sta-
bilisation to advance from peace-building to 
‘peace processes’ which Selby (2011) distin-
guishes as the ‘sharply realist power politics’ 
of transitional arrangements of local elites 
during and after conflict. Peace processes 
engender a hybrid and positive peace; quite 
distinct from liberal, negative, rented, victor’s 
peace to which the current Stabilisation para-
digm is currently configured. 
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